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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This study  aims  to develop  a Bayesian  methodology  to identify,  quantify  and  measure  operational  risk
in several  business  lines  of  commercial  banking.  To  do this,  a  Bayesian  network  (BN)  model  is designed
with  prior  and  subsequent  distributions  to  estimate  the  frequency  and  severity.  Regarding  the  subsequent
distributions,  an inference  procedure  for the maximum  expected  loss,  for a  period  of  20 days,  is carried
out  by  using  the  Monte  Carlo  simulation  method.  The  business  lines  analyzed  are  marketing  and  sales,
retail  banking  and  private  banking,  which  all together  accounted  for  88.5%  of  the  losses  in 2011.  Data
was  obtained  for  the period  2007–2011  from  the  Riskdata  Operational  Exchange  Association  (ORX),  and
external  data  was  provided  from  qualiﬁed  experts  to complete  the  missing  records  or to improve  its  poor
quality.
© 2016  Universidad  ICESI.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the
CC  BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Esta  investigación  tiene  como  propósito  desarrollar  una  metodología  bayesiana  para  identiﬁcar,  cuan-
tiﬁcar  y  medir  el riesgo  operacional  en  distintas  líneas  de  negocio  de  la  banca  comercial.  Para  ello  se
disen˜a  un  modelo  de  red  bayesiana  con  distribuciones  a priori  y  a  posteriori  para  estimar  la  frecuencia  yalabras clave:
iesgo operacional
nálisis bayesiano
imulación Monte Carlo
la severidad.  Con  las  distribuciones  a  posteriori  se realiza  inferencia  sobre  la  máxima  pérdida  esperada,
para  un  período  de  20 días,  utilizando  el  método  de  simulación  Monte  Carlo.  Las  líneas  de  negocio  anali-
zadas son  comercialización  y  ventas,  banca  minorista  y banca  privada,  que  en  conjunto  representaron  el
88,5%  de  las pérdidas  en  2011.  Los  datos  fueron  obtenidos  de la Asociación  Riskdata  Operacional  Exchange
(ORX)  para  el período  2007-2011,  y la  información  externa  fue  proporcionada  por  expertos  caliﬁcados
para  completar  los  registros  faltantes  o  mejorar  los  datos  de  mala  calidad.© 2016  Universidad  ICESI. Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Este  es un  artı´culo  Open  Access  bajo  la
licencia  CC  BY  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
∗ Corresponding author at: Cerro del Vigía 15, Col. Campestre Churubusco, Del. Coyoacán, 04200 México D.F., Mexico.
E-mail address: fvenegas1111@yahoo.com.mx (F. Venegas-Martínez).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.estger.2016.06.004
123-5923/© 2016 Universidad ICESI. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.
/).
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Uma  análise  do  risco  operacional  no  sistema  bancário  internacional:
uma  abordagem  bayesiana  (2007-2011)
lassiﬁcac¸ ões JEL:
81
11
15
r  e  s  u  m  o
Esta  pesquisa  tem  como  objetivo  desenvolver  uma  metodologia  Bayesiana  para  identiﬁcar,  quantiﬁcar  e
medir  o risco  operacional  em  diversas  linhas  de  negócio  da banca  comercial.  Isso  requer  (e é  projetado)
um  modelo  de  Rede  Bayesiana  (RB), com  distribuic¸ ões  anteriores  e posteriores  para  estimar  a  frequência  e
a  severidade.  Com  as  distribuic¸ ões  posteriores  é realizada  una  inferência  sobre  a perda máxima  esperada
por  um  período  de 20 dias,  usando  o  método  de  simulac¸ ão  de  Monte  Carlo.  As  linhas  de negócio  analisadasalavras-chave:
isco operacional
nálise bayesiana
imulac¸ ão de Monte Carlo
são  marketing  e vendas,  banca  de  retalho  e banca  privada,  que  juntos  representaram  88,5%  das  perdas
em  2011.  Os dados  foram  obtidos  a partir da  Associac¸ ão  Riskdata  Operacional  Exchange  (ORX)  para
o  período  2007-2011,  e a informac¸ ão  externa  foi  fornecida  por  peritos  qualiﬁcados  para  completar  os
registros  ausentes  ou  melhorar  os  dados  de  má  qualidade.
©  2016  Universidad  ICESI.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Este e´  um  artigo  Open  Access sob uma. Introduction
While in 2004 regulators focused on market, credit and liquid-
ty risk, in 2011 attention was mainly placed on the high-proﬁle
oss events affecting several major ﬁnancial institutions, which
enewed operational risk management and corporate governance.
or global markets, the signiﬁcance of loss events (measured, in
ome cases, in billions of dollars) showed that the lack of an
ppropriate operational risk management may  affect even major
nancial institutions.
The current challenge is how to manage proactively operational
isk in a business environment characterized by sustained volatil-
ty. Needless to say ﬁnancial organizations need advanced tools,
odels, techniques and methodologies that combine internal data
ith external data across industry. For example, organizations in
he banking and insurance sectors can provide critical insights
rom self-assessment and scenario modeling from the combina-
ion of internal data with external data on loss events that triggers
cross the industry. External loss event data not only provides
nsights from the experiences of industry peers, but also allows a
ore effective identiﬁcation of potential risk exposure. For increas-
ng effectiveness in analyzing potential risk exposure, predictive
ndexes and indicators combining internal and external data may
e developed for a more effective operational risk management.
hese predictions will lead to a more accurate evaluation of poten-
ial future losses.
The Bayesian approach may  be an appropriate alternative for
perational risk analysis when initial and/or complementary infor-
ation from qualiﬁed consultants is available. By construction,
ayesian models incorporate initial or complementary informa-
ion about parameter values of a sampling distribution through a
rior probability distribution, which includes subjective informa-
ion provided by expert opinions, analyst judgments or specialist
eliefs. Subsequently, a posterior distribution is estimated to carry
ut inference on the parameter values. This paper develops a
ayesian Network (BN) model to examine the relationships among
perational risk (OR) events in the three lines of business with
reater losses in the international banking sector. The proposed
N model is calibrated with observed data from events occurred
n these lines of business and/or with information obtained from
xperts or from external sources.1 In this case, experts mainly com-
lete missing records or improve data of poor quality. The analysis
1 When referring to experts, they are banking ofﬁcials who  have the experience
nd knowledge of the operation and management of the bank business lines.licenc¸ a CC  BY  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
period for this research is from 2007 to 2011 on the basis of a
twenty-day frequency. This period starts one year before the ﬁnan-
cial crisis generated by subprime mortgages.
OR usually involves a small part of total annual losses from
commercial banks; however, at the time an extreme event of oper-
ational risk occurs, it can cause signiﬁcant losses. For this reason,
major changes in the worldwide banking industry are aimed at hav-
ing better policies and recommendations concerning operational
risk. It is noteworthy that exist in the literature various statistical
techniques to identify and quantify OR, which have the under-
lying assumption of independence between risk events; see, for
example: Degen, Embrechts, and Lambrigger (2007), Moscadelli
(2004), Embrechts, Furrer, and Kaufmann (2003). However, as
shown in Aquaro et al. (2009), Supatgiat, Kenyon, and Heusler
(2006), Carrillo-Menéndez and Suárez-González (2015), Carrillo-
Menéndez, Marhuenda-Menéndez, and Suárez-González (2007),
Cruz (2002), Cruz, Peters, and Shevchenko (2002), Neil, Marquez,
and Fenton (2004) and Alexander (2002) there is a causal relation-
ship between OR factors.
Despite the research from Reimer and Neu (2003, 2002), Kartik
and Reimer (2007), Aquaro et al. (2009), Neil et al. (2004) and
Alexander (2002), that apply the BN scheme in OR  management,
there is no a complete guide on how to classify, identify, quantify OR
events, and how to calculate economic capital consistently.2 This
work aims to close these gaps. First, establishing OR event informa-
tion structures so that it is possible to quantify the OR events and
then changing the assumption of independence of events in order
to model more realistically the causality relationship of OR events.
The possibility of using conditional distribution (discrete or con-
tinuous), calibrating the model with both objective and subjective
information sources, and establishing causal relationships among
risk factors, is precisely what distinguishes our research compared
with classical statistical models. Under this framework, this paper is
aimed at calculating, with several conﬁdence levels, the maximum
expected loss over a period of 20 days for the group of international
banks associated to the ORX regarding the studied lines of busi-
ness of commercial banks, which has to be considered to properly
manage operational risk in ORX.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
typology to be used for OR management in accordance with
the Data Operational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX). Sec-
tion 3, brieﬂy, reviews the main methods, models and tools for
2 Usually, to measure the maximum expected loss (or economic capital) by OR
value it is used the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR).
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easuring OR. Section 4 discusses the theoretical framework
eeded for the development of this research, emphasizing on the
dvantages and beneﬁts of using BNs. Section 5 provides two BN,
ne for frequency and other for severity. In order to quantify the OR
t each node of the network, we ﬁt prior distributions by using the
Risk software. Once the prior probabilities of both networks are
stimated, we proceed to calculate posterior probabilities and, sub-
equently, we use the junction tree algorithm to eradicate cycles
hen the directionality is eliminated (See Appendix). Section 6
ombines prior and posterior distributions to compute the loss dis-
ribution by using Monte Carlo simulation. Here, the maximum
xpected loss arising from operational risk events for a period of
0 days is calculated. Finally, we present conclusions and
cknowledge limitations.
. Operational risk events in the international banking
ector
This section describes, in some detail, the operational risk events
elated to the international banking sector according with the Data
perational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX).
External frauds
We  describe now the operational risk events related to external
fraud according to ORX:
a) Fraud and theft: these are losses due to a fraudulent act, misap-
propriate property, or law circumvent, by a third party without
the assistance of the bank staff.
b) Security systems: this applies to all events related to unautho-
rized access to electronic data ﬁles.
Internal frauds
The operational risk events related to internal fraud are
described below:
a) Fraud and theft: losses due to fraudulent acts, improper appro-
priations of goods, or evasion of regulation or company policy,
that involves the participation of internal staff.
b) Unauthorized activities: losses caused from unreported
intentional and unauthorized operations, or intentionally
unregistered positions.
c) Security systems: this previous category applies to all events
involving unauthorized access to electronic data ﬁles for per-
sonal proﬁt with the assistance of employee’s access.
Malicious damage
Losses caused by acts of badness or hatred, in others words
malicious damage.
a) Deliberate damage: this is concerned with acts of vandalism,
excluding events in security systems.
b) Terrorism: ill-intentioned damage caused by terrorist acts
excluding events related to security systems.
c) Security systems (external): these events include security
events with deliberate damage in external systems made by
a third party without the assistance of internal staff (e.g., the
spread of software viruses).
d) Security systems (internal): this includes deliberate events in
the security of internal systems with the participation of inter-
nal staff (e.g., the spread of software viruses).
Labor practices and workplace safety
Labor practices and safety at workplace are losses derived
from actions not in agreement with labor, health or safety
regulation. Payment claims for bodily injury or loss of dis-
criminatory events. Mandatory insurance programs for workers
and regulation on safety in the workplace are included in this
category.
Customers, products and business practiceGerenciales 32 (2016) 208–220
Business practices, these events consider losses arising from an
unintentional or negligent breach of a professional obligation to
speciﬁc clients or the design of a product, including ﬁduciary and
suitability requirements.
• Disasters and accidents
Disasters and accidents reﬂects losses resulting from damage to
physical assets from natural disasters, or other events like trafﬁc
accidents.
• Technology and infrastructure failure
Losses caused by failures in systems or management.
a) Failures in technology and infrastructure, such as hardware,
software and telecommunications malfunctioning.
b) Failures in management processes.
3. Operational risk measurement in the international
banking sector
Operational risk management usually involves a small part of
total annual losses from international banks; however, when an
unexpected extreme event, that occasionally occurs, may  cause
signiﬁcant losses. For this reason, major changes in the world-
wide banking industry are aimed at obtaining better policies
and/or recommendations concerning with operational risk man-
agement. Financial globalization and local regulation leads us also
to rethink and reorganize operational risk associated to interna-
tional banking, including those too big to fail. In this sense, a
suitable operational management in the international banking sec-
tor may avoid possible bankruptcy and contagion and, therefore,
systemic risk. The available approaches to deal with this issue
vary from simple to highly complex methods with very sophis-
ticated statistical models. Now, we brieﬂy describe some of the
existing methods in the literature for measuring OR; see, for exam-
ple, Heinrich (2006) and Basel II (2001a, 2001b). It will be also
emphasized in this subsection on the advantages and beneﬁts of
using BN.
1) The “top-down” single indicator methods. These methods were
chosen by the Basel Committee as a ﬁrst approach to opera-
tional risk measurement. A single indicator of the institution as
total income, volatility of income, or total expenditure, can be
considered as the functional variable to manage the risk.
2) The “bottom-up” models including expert judgment. The basis
for an expert analysis is a set of scenarios. In this case, experts
mainly complete missing records or improve data of poor quality
of the identiﬁed risks and their probabilities of occurrence in
alternative scenarios.
3) Internal measurement. The Basel Committee proposes the inter-
nal measurement approach as a more advanced method for
calculating the regulatory capital.
4) The classical statistical approach. This framework is similar to
what is used in the quantiﬁcation methods for market risk, and
more recently the credit risk. However, contrary to what hap-
pens with market risk, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a widely accepted
statistical method.
5) Causal models. As an alternative to the classical statistical frame-
work, causal models assume dependence in the occurrence
of OR events. Under this approach, each event represents a
random variable (discrete or continuous) with a conditional
distribution function. In case that the events have no histori-
cal records or data has poor quality, it is required the opinion
or judgment of experts to determine the conditional probabil-
ities of occurrence. The tool for modeling this causality is just
the BN, which is based on Bayes’ theorem and the network
topology.
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They are random variables that can be discrete or continuous and
have associated probability distributions. One of the purposes of
this research is to compute the monthly maximum expected lossJ.F. Martínez-Sánchez et al. / Est
. Theoretical framework for Bayesian network
In this section the theory supporting the development of the
roposed BN is presented. It begins with a discussion of the condi-
ional value at risk (CVaR) as a coherent risk measure in the sense
f Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999). The CVaR will be used
o compute the expected loss. Afterward, the main concepts of the
N approach are introduced.
Acording to Panjer (2006), the CVaR or Expected Shortfall (ES)
s an alternative measure to Value at Risk (VaR) that quantiﬁes the
osses that can be found in the distributions tails. Speciﬁcally, let X
e the random variable representing the losses, the CVaR of X with
 (1 − p) × 100% conﬁdence level, denoted by CVaR(X), represents
he expected loss given that the total losses exceed the 100 × p
uantile of the distribution of X. Thus, CVaRp (X) can be written as:
VaRp(X) = E[X|X > xp] =
∫ ∞
xp
x dF(x)
1 − F(xp) (1)
here F(x) is the cumulative distribution function of X. Hence, the
VaR(X) can be seen as the average of all the values of VaR with a p ×
00% conﬁdence level. Finally, notice that CVaR(X) can be rewritten
s:
VaRp(X) = E[X|X > xp] = xp +
∫ ∞
xp
(x − xp) dF(x)
1 − F(xp) =VaRp(x) + e(xp).
(2)
here e(xp) is the average excess of loss function.3
The Bayesian framework
In statistical analysis there are two main paradigms, the fre-
quentist and the Bayesian. The main difference between them is
the deﬁnition of probability. The frequentist states that the prob-
ability of an event is the limit of its relative frequency in the long
run. While the Bayesian argue that probability is subjective. The
subjective probability (degree of belief) is based on knowledge
and experience and is represented through a prior distribution.
The subjective beliefs are updated by adding new information
to the sampling distribution through Bayes’ theorem obtaining
a posterior distribution, which is used to make inferences on
the parameters of the sampling model. Thus, a Bayesian deci-
sion maker learns and revises its beliefs based on new available
information.4 Formally, Bayes’ theorem states that
P(|y) ∝ L(|y)() (3)
where  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, y is
a vector of observations recorded, () is the prior distribution,
L(|y) is the likelihood function for , and P(|y) is the posterior
distribution of . Two main questions arise, how to translate prior
information in an analytical form, (), and how to assess the
sensitive of the posterior with respect to the prior selection.5
A BN is a graph representing the domain of decision variables,
its quantitative and qualitative relations and their probabilities.
A BN may  also include utility functions that represent the pre-
ferences of the decision maker. An important feature of a BN is
its graphical form, which allows a visual representation of com-
plicated probabilistic reasoning. Another relevant aspect is the
qualitative and quantitative parts of a BN, allowing incorporate
subjective elements such as expert opinion. Perhaps the most
3 For a complete analysis on the non coherence of VaR see Venegas-Martínez
2006).
4 For a review of issues associated with Bayes’ theorem see Zellner (1971).
5 These questions are a very important topic Bayesian inference; see, in this
egard, Ferguson (1973).Gerenciales 32 (2016) 208–220 211
important feature of a BN is that it is a direct representation of
the real world and not a way of thinking. Each node is associated
with a set of tables of probabilities in a BN. The nodes stand for the
relevant variables, which can be discrete or continuous.6 A causal
network according to Pearl (2000) is a BN with the additional
property that the “parent” nodes are the directed causes.7
A BN is used primarily for inference by calculating conditional
probabilities given the information available at each time for each
node (beliefs). There are two classes of algorithms for the infer-
ence process: the ﬁrst generates an exact solution and the second
produces an approximate solution with high probability to be
in close proximity to the exact solution. Among the exact infer-
ence algorithms, we have for example: polytree, clique tree, tree
junction, algorithms of variable elimination and Pear’s method.
The use of approximate solutions is based on the exponential
growth of the processing time required to obtain exact solutions.
According to Guo and Hsu (2002) such algorithms can be grouped
in: stochastic simulation methods, model simpliﬁcation meth-
ods, search based methods, and loopy propagation methods. The
best known is the stochastic simulation, which is, in turn, divided
in sampling algorithms and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods.
5. Building a Bayesian network for the international
banking sector
In what follows, we will be concerned with building the BN for
the international banking sector. The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne the prob-
lem domain where the purpose of the NB is speciﬁed. Subsequently,
the important variables and nodes are deﬁned. Then, the interrela-
tionships between nodes and variables are graphically represented.
The resulting model must be validated by experts in the ﬁeld. In
case of disagreement between them, we return to one of the above
steps until reaching consensus. The last three steps are: incorporate
expert opinion (referred to as the quantiﬁcation of the network),
create plausible scenarios with the network (network applications),
and ﬁnally network maintenance.
The main problems that a risk manager faces when using a BN
are: how to implement a Bayesian network, how to model the struc-
ture, how to quantify the network, how to use subjective data (from
experts) and/or objective (statistical data), what tools should be
used for best results, and how to validate the model. The answers
to these questions will be addressed in the development of our pro-
posal. Moreover, one of the objectives of this paper is to develop a
guide for implementing a NB to manage operational risk in inter-
national banking associated with ORX. We  also seek to generate a
consistent measurement of the minimal capital requirements for
managing OR.
We will be concerned with the analysis of operational risk events
occurring in the following lines of business: marketing and sales,
retail banking and private banking of international banks joined
to the Operational Riskdata eXchange Association. Once the risk
factors linked with each business line are identiﬁed, the nodes
that will be part of the Bayesian network have to be deﬁned.6 The following deﬁnitions will be needed for the subsequent development of
this research: Deﬁnition 1, Bayesian networks are directed acyclic graph (DAGs);
Deﬁnition 2, a graph is deﬁned as a set of nodes connected by arcs; Deﬁnition 3, if
between each pair of nodes there is a precedence relationship represented by arcs,
then  the graph is directed; Deﬁnition 4, A cycle is a path that starts and ends at the
same node; and Deﬁnition 5, A path is a series of contiguous nodes connected by
directed arcs.
7 See Jensen (1996) for a review of the BN theory.
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Table 1
Network nodes for severity.
Node Description States (loss D )
Failure in ICT and
disaster
Failure in information
technologies (ICT) and
disaster
0–500
500–1000
1000–1500
1500–2000
2000–2500
2500–3000
More than 3000
People Human mistakes 0–5000
5000–10,000
10,000–15,000
15,000–20,000
20,000–25,000
25,000–30,000
30,000–35,000
More than 35,000
Processes Failure in processes 0–20,000
20,000–40,000
40,000–60,000
60,000–80,000
80,000–100,000
100,000–120,000
120,000–140,000
More than 140,000
Loss (severity) Expected loss for
operational risk events
0–20,000
20,000–40,000
40,000–60,000
60,000–80,000
80,000–100,000
100,000–120,000
S
a
o
t
•
•
Table 2
Network nodes for frequency.
Node Description States
Internal fraud and
employment practices
Internal fraud and bad
practices that lead to
operational risk events
0–120
120–170
170–220
220–270
270–320
More than 320
Failure in ICT and
disaster
Failure in information
technologies (ICT) and
disaster
0–30
30–50
50–70
70–90
More than 90
External fraud External events that
are not likely to
prevent or manage
0–425
425–550
550–675
675–800
800–925
925–1050
More than 1050
Management processes Performance in
banking business
processes
0–150
150–300
300–450
450–600
600–750
750–900
More than 900
Failure frequency Number of failures
over a period of time
0–1000
1000–1250
1250–1500
1500–1750
1750–2000
2000–2250
2250–2500
More than 2500
equal number of successes, 20, is assumed. This assumption isMore than 120,000
ource: Own elaboration.
ssociated to transnational banks belonging to ORX. The frequency
f the available data is every twenty days, ranging from 2007
hrough 2011.
Building and quantifying the model
The nodes are connected with directed arcs (arrows) to form
a structure that shows the dependence or causal relationship
between them. The BN is divided into two networks, one for
modeling the frequency and the other for the severity. Once
the results are obtained separately, they are aggregated through
Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the loss distribution. Usually,
the severity network requires a signiﬁcant amount of probabil-
ity distributions. In what follows, the characteristics and states
of each node of the networks for severity and frequency are
described in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
In the Bayesian approach, the parameters of a sample model
are treated as random variables. The prior knowledge about the
possible values of the parameters is modeled by a speciﬁc prior
distribution. Thus, when initial is vague or has little importance a
uniform, maybe improper, distribution will allow the data speak
for itself. The information and tools for the design and construc-
tion of the NB constitute the main input for Bayesian analysis;
therefore, it is necessary to keep sources of reliable information
be consistent with best practices and international standards on
quality of information systems, such as ISO/IEC 73: 2000 and ISO
72: 2006.
Statistical analysis of the Bayesian network for frequency
In this section, each node of the network for frequency will be
deﬁned. In the case of nodes in which historical data is available,
we ﬁt the corresponding probability distribution to data. While in
nodes with available prior information useful to complete missing
records or improve data of poor quality, the Bayesian approach
will be used. Regarding the node labeled “In Fraud Labor Pr”Source: Own  elaboration.
(Internal Fraud and Labor Practices), the prior distribution that
best ﬁt the available information is shown in Fig. 1.
With respect to the node labeled “Disaster ICT” the associated
risks are in database managing, online transactions, batch pro-
cesses, and external disasters, among others. We  are concerned
with determine the probabilities that information systems fail or
that uncontrollable external events affect the operation of auto-
mated processes. In this case, the prior distribution that best ﬁt
the available information is shown in Fig. 2.
With regard to the probabilities of the labeled node “Pract
Business” (Business Practices), these are associated with events
related to actions and activities in the banking sector that
generate losses from malpractice and that directly impact the
functioning of the banking. In this case, the distribution that best
ﬁt the data reported to the ORX is shown in Fig. 3.
External frauds are exogenous operational risk events for which
there is no control but there is a record of their frequency and
severity. In this case, the probabilities of occurrence are estimated
by ﬁtting a Negative Binomial distribution as shown in Fig. 4.
The proper functioning of banking institutions depends on the
performance of their processes. The maturity of these systems is
associated with quality management process and product level.
The distribution of the node labeled as “Process Management” is
shown in Fig. 5.
Finally, for the target node “Frequency”, it is ﬁtted a negative
binomial distribution with success probability p = 0.012224, anconsistent with the ﬁnancial practice and studies of operational
risk by assuming that the number of failures usually follows a
Poisson or negative Binomial.
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Statistical analysis of the severity network
In this section, each node of the severity network is analyzed.
For each node with available historical information the distri-
bution that best ﬁt the data is determined. The node “Disaster
TIC” has the following exponential density that best ﬁt the losses
caused by failure of not controllable systems and external events.
The distribution for disaster and ICT Failure is shown in Fig. 6.
In order to determine the goodness of ﬁt the Akaike’s test is
used. Moreover, a comparison of theoretical and sample quantiles
is shown in Fig. 7.
In what follows, a proper ﬁt is seen in most data and infor-
mation. Thus, the null hypothesis that the sampling distribution
is described from a Weibull is accepted. This network node for
severity constitutes a prior distribution. Also, for the “People”
node the density that best ﬁt available information is an extreme
value Weibull density, and it is shown in Fig. 8.
As before, we carry out a test for goodness of ﬁt, and a compara-
tive analysis of quantiles for the theoretical sampling distribution
is shown in Fig. 9.The distribution that best ﬁt the available information for losses
caused by events related to the administrative, technical and
service processes performed in the various lines of business ofthe international banking sector is described with an extreme
value Weibull distribution as shown in Fig. 10. Also, a compara-
tive analysis of quantiles for the theoretical sampling distribution
is shown in Fig. 11.
Finally, the target node “Severity” represents the losses associ-
ated with the nodes “People”, “Disaster CIT” and “Processes”. To
estimate the parameters of the distribution of severity, a Weibull
distribution is adjusted to the severity data. The parameters found
are  ˛ = 1.22 and  ˇ = 42,592, representing the location and scale,
respectively. In the next section, the posterior probabilities will
be computed.
• The posterior distributions
After analyzing each of the networks for frequency and severity,
and assigning the corresponding probability distribution func-
tions, the posterior probabilities will be now generated. To do this,
inference techniques for the Bayesian Networks will be applied.
Particularly, we will be using the junction tree algorithm (Guo &
Hsu, 2002). The posterior probabilities for nodes of the network
frequency having at least one parent are shown in Fig. 12.The results of the node “process management” show that there
is an approximate 2% chance of failures in a segment consid-
ering between 150 and 300 events related to the management
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the OpVaR with a conﬁdence level of 95%, we have a maximum
expected loss of D 88.4 million over a period of 20 days for the group
of international banks associated to the ORX.10ig. 11. Comparison of quantiles.
ource:  Own  elaboration by using @Risk.
process over a period of 20 days; a 27% chance of occurrences in a
segment considering between 300 and 450 events; a probability
of 0.47 of having failure occurrences in an interval considering
between 450 and 600 events, and a 20% chance in a segment
considering between 600 and 750 events associated with the
administration of banking processes. The calculated probabili-
ties are conditioned by the presence of events related to internal
fraud and work processes.
Regarding the node “external fraud” the occurrences between
425 and 550 external frauds over a period of 20 days have an
approximate probability of 0.17; between 550 and 675 events
a probability of 0.3; between 675 and 800 external fraud the
probability is 0.27; and for more than 800 frauds the probabil-
ity is about 0.2. All these probabilities are conditional on the
existence of events related disasters, failures in ICT, and labor
practices.
Finally, the probability distribution of the node “Frequency”
shows an approximate 15% chance, over a period of 20 days,
that failures occur up to 1250; a probability of 25% in a segment
considering between 1250 and 1500; a probability of 0.26 in an
interval considering between 1500 and 1750 failures; an approx-
imate 19% chance in a segment considering between 1750 and
2000 events; a probability of 0.9 in a segment containing between
2000 and 2250 failures, and approximately 5% chance that 2250
failures occur over a period of 20 days. These are the conditionalGerenciales 32 (2016) 208–220
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probabilities to risk factors such as external fraud, process efﬁ-
ciency and people reliability.
Finally, it is important to point out that for determining the
probabilities of each node in the frequency network, the negative
binomial plays an important role since there is signiﬁcant empir-
ical evidence that the frequency of operational risk events have
an adequate ﬁt under this distribution. In the case of the network
of severity, it has the posterior distribution shown in Fig. 13.
The losses caused by human errors on average are 12,263 Euros
in periods of 20 days. With regard to losses for catastrophic events
such as demonstrations, ﬂoods, and ICT failure, among others, are
on average 870 Euros. In terms of process failures on average they
have a loss every 20 days of 27,204 Euros. The probability distri-
bution of the node “Severity” shows that there is a probability
of 0.33 of the occurrence of a loss between 0 and 20,000 Euros;
a probability of 0.2 between 20,000 and 40,000, a 10% chance
between 60,000 and 80,000 Euros, a 6% chance between 80,000
and 100,000 Euros, and approximately a 6% chance that the loss
be greater than 100,000 Euros in a period of 20 days.
6. Value at operational risk
Once we  have carried out the Bayesian inference process to
obtain posterior distributions for the frequency of OR events and the
severity of losses in the previous section, we  now proceed to inte-
grate both distributions through Monte Carlo8 simulation by using
the “Compound” function of @Risk. To achieve this goal, we gener-
ate the distribution function of potential losses by using a negative
binomial for frequency and an extreme value Weibull distribution
for severity.9 It is worthy to mention that Monte Carlo simula-
tion method has the disadvantage that it requires high processing
capacity and, of course, is based on a random number genera-
tor. For the calculation of OpVar the values obtained are arranged
for expected losses in descending order and the corresponding
percentiles are calculated in Table 3. Accordingly, if we calculate8 The simulation results are available via e-mail request marzan67@gmail.com.
9 Other alternative statistical method is the copula approach, though not always
a  closed solution can be found.
10 For a complete list of banks associated see http://www.orx.org/orx-members.
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Table 3
Percentiles for Bayesian model.
Position Losses (D ) Percentage
9622 135,413,727.38 100.00%
8982 131,176,038.11 99.90%
9435 130,218,813.55 99.90%
6995 129,793,806.36 99.90%
6645 124,593,969.74 99.90%
6487 124,470,160.96 99.90%
1516 122,407,799.73 99.90%
8881 118,657,656.06 99.90%
771  117,984,437.39 99.90%
7645 117,606,673.03 99.90%
2305 116,262,949.32 99.80%
5024 115,407,667.31 99.80%
6449 115,283,482.79 99.80%
999  114,692,910.29 99.80%
2060 114,195,679.10 99.80%
3720 113,461,486.17 99.80%
4120 113,391,200.37 99.80%
5088 113,293,233.82 99.80%
1789 113,079,925.31 99.80%
64  112,978,179.49 99.80%
.  . .
2559 96,082,951.45 98.10%
2607 96,036,899.87 98.00%
8393 96,036,097.99 98.00%
3877 95,957,705.18 98.00%
5895 95,901,765.22 98.00%
8329 95,865,557.01 98.00%
1213 95,858,547.94 98.00%
7940 95,847,089.05 98.00%
5866 95,696,438.40 98.00%
4608 95,696,191.31 98.00%
7151 95,632,162.12 98.00%
5939 95,455,846.07 97.90%
6161 95,409,510.44 97.90%
622  95,367,523.21 97.90%
6899 95,311,650.62 97.90%
3771 95,304,390.04 97.90%
3042 95,265,269.48 97.90%
1256 95,261,114.91 97.90%
9712 95,256,473.11 97.90%
1943 95,139,840.10 97.90%
1038 95,132,874.12 97.90%
.  . .
9618 88,408,111.80 95.10%
2989 88,406,427.34 95.10%
8131 88,400,173.73 95.00%
8446 88,396,425.98 95.00%
7811 88,293,244.91 95.00%
940  88,288,312.72 95.00%
7655 88,285,525.53 95.00%
4666 88,207,565.35 95.00%
4654 88,165,650.42 95.00%
9973 88,152,913.81 95.00%
6944 88,149,275.18 95.00%
9940 88,146,575.13 95.00%
7528 88,110,981.98 94.90%
2222 88,095,871.13 94.90%
2657 88,075,028.67 94.90%
3163 88,064,696.68 94.90%
9360 88,057,973.00 94.90%
7694 88,053,418.86 94.90%
9256 88,048,859.73 94.90%
7542 88,044,642.79 94.90%
3059 88,025,745.60 94.90%
S
7
f
i
iource: Own elaboration.
. ConclusionsTransnational banks generate large amounts of information
rom the interaction with customers, with the industry and with
nternal processes. However, the interaction with the individuals
nvolved in the processes and systems also required some attentionGerenciales 32 (2016) 208–220
and this considered by the Operational Riskdata eXchange Asso-
ciation that has stated several standards for the registration and
measurement of operational risk.
This paper has provided the theoretical elements and practi-
cal guidance necessary to identify, quantify and manage OR in the
international banking sector under the Bayesian approach. This
research uses elements more attached to reality such as: spe-
ciﬁc probability distributions (discrete or continuous) for each risk
factor, additional data and information updating the model, and
relationships (causality) of risk factors. It was  shown that the BN
framework is a viable option for managing OR in an environment
of uncertainty and scarce information or with questionable quality.
The capital requirement is calculated by combining statistical data
with opinions and judgments of experts, as well as, external infor-
mation, which is more consistent with reality. The BNs as a tool
for managing OR in lines of business of the international banking
sector have several advantages over other models:
• The BN is able to incorporate the four essential elements of
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA): internal data, exter-
nal data, scenario analysis and factors reﬂecting the business
environment and the control system in a simple model.
• The BN can be built into a “multi-level” model, which can display
various levels of dependency between the various risk factors.
• The BN running on a network of decision can provide a cost-
beneﬁt analysis of risk factors, where the optimum controls are
determined within a scenario analysis.
• The BN is a direct representation of the real world, not a way of
thinking as neural networks. Arrows or arcs in networks stand
for the actual causal connections.
It is important to point out that the CVaR used in the Bayesian
approach is consistent in the sense of Artzner et al. (1999), but
also summarizes the complex causal relationships between the dif-
ferent risk factors that result in operational risk events. In short,
because the reality is much more complex than independent events
identically distributed, the Bayesian approach is an alternative to
model a complex and dynamic reality.
Finally, among the main empirical results, it is worth mention-
ing that after calculating the OpVaR, with a conﬁdence level of 95%,
the maximum expected loss over a period of 20 days for the group
of international banks associated to the ORX was  D 88.4 million,
which is a signiﬁcant amount to be considered to manage opera-
tional risk in ORX for the studied lines of business of commercial
banks.
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Appendix. An exact algorithm for Bayesian inference
Among the accurate inference algorithms, we have: Pearl’s
(1988) polytree; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988) clique tree, and
Cowell, Dawid, Lauritzen, and Spiegelhalter’s (1999) junction tree.
Pearl’s method is one of the earliest and most widely used. The
spread of beliefs according to Pearl (1988) follow the following pro-
cess. Let e be the set of values for all observed variables. For any
variable X, e can be divided into two  subsets: e−X representing all
the observed variables descending from X, and e+X corresponding
to all other observed variables. The impact of the observed vari-
ables on the beliefs of X can be represented by the following two
values:
(X) = P(e−X |X) (A1)
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(X) = P(e+X |X). (A2)
That is, (X) and (X) are vectors whose elements are associated
ith the values of X:
(X) = [(X = x1), (X = x2), . . .,  (X = xl)] (A3)
(X) = [(X = x1), (X = x2), . . .,  (X = xl)] (A4)
The posterior distribution is obtained by using (A1) and (A2),
hus
(X|e) = ˛(X)(X) (A5)
here  ˛ = 1/P(e). In order to infer new beliefs, Eq. (A5) is used. The
alues of (X) and (X) are calculated as follows: (Y1, Y2, . . .,  Ym)
here Y1, Y2, . . .,  Ym are children of X. When X takes the value x0,
he elements of vector (X) are assigned as follows:
(xi) =
{
0 si xi /= x0.
1 si xi = x0.
In the case in which X has no value, we have e−X =
⋃m
i=1e
−
yi
. Hence,
y using (A1), (X) expands as:
(X) = P(e−X |X) (A6)
 P(e−y1 , e
−
y2
, . . .,  e−ym |X) (A7)
 P(e−y1 |X)P(e−y2 |X)· · ·P(e−ym |X) (A8)
 y1 (X)y2 (X). . .ym (X), (A9)
By using the fact that e−y1 , e
−
y2
, . . .,  e−ym are conditionally inde-
endent, and deﬁning
yi (X) = P(e−X |X),
t follows that
yi (X) = P(e−Y |X) (A10)∑
yi
P(e−yi , yi|X) (A11)∑
yi
P(e−yi |yi, X)P(yi|X) (A12)∑
yi
P(e−yi |yi)P(yi|X) (A13)∑
yi
yiP(yi|X). (A14)
The last expression shows that in calculating the value of (X)
he values of  and conditional probabilities of all children X are
equired. Therefore, vector (X) is calculated as:
(X) = ˘c ∈ children (X)
∑
v ∈ c
(v)P(v|X). (A15)
For the calculation of (X) it is used the father Y of the X values.
ndeed, by using (A2), it follows
(X) = P(X|e+X ) (A16)∑
yi
P(X, yi|e+Xi ) (A17)∑
yi
P(X|yi, e+Xi )P(yi|e
+
X ) (A18)
∑
yi
P(X|yi)P(yi|e+X ) (A19)
∑yi
P(X|yi, e+Xi ) (yi). (A20)
This shows that when calculating (X), the values of  of the
athers X and their conditional probabilities are necessary.Gerenciales 32 (2016) 208–220 219
There might be some difﬁculties in dealing with Pearl’s infer-
ence method due to the generated cycles when the directionality
is eliminated. Cowell et al. (1999) junction tree algorithm may
overcome this situation. First, it converts a directed graph into
a tree whose nodes are closed to proceed to spread the values
of  and  through the tree. The summarized procedure is as
follows:
1. “Moralize” the BN.
2. Triangulate the moralized graph.
3. Let the cliques of the triangulated graph be the nodes of a tree,
which is the desired junction-tree.
4. Propagate  and  values throughout the junction-tree to make
inference. Propagation will produce posterior probabilities.
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